Intention and Goal-Conciliation by Rauen, Fábio José
Memorare, Tubarão, v. 7, n. 2, maio/ago. 2020. ISSN: 2358-0593 
Intention and Goal-Conciliation 
Intenção e conciliação de metas 
Fábio	José	Rauen	(Unisul,	Doutor	em	Letras/Linguística)*	
DOI:	10.19177/memorare.v7e2202027-43	
Abstract:	I	analyze	in	this	study	potentialities	of	modeling	communicative	
interactions	assuming	one	can	conceive	processes	of	ostensive	communication	
as	converting	practical	intentions	into	informative	and	communicative	
intentions.	So,	one	can	only	achieve	collaboratively	a	practical	intention	
through	the	recognition	the	speaker	intends	to	make	mutually	manifest	or	
more	manifest	certain	set	of	assumptions	by	overtly	or	communicative	
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Imagine	a	possible	world	in	such	a	way	all	human	beings	are	guided	by	the	
cognitive	principle	of	relevance	and	consider	relevant	only	the	stimuli	whose	
positive	cognitive	effects	compensate	the	processing	effort	required	to	
achieve	them.	Imagine	now	there	is	no	reason	to	generate	stimuli	in	this	
possible	world.	
1 Introduction 
I	define	goal-conciliation	theory	(RAUEN,	2014)	as	a	pragmatic-
cognitive	approach—based	on	cognitive	and	communicative	relevance-
theoretic	notions	(SPERBER;	WILSON,	1986,	1995)—which	aims	to	
describe	and	explain	ostensive-inferential	communicative	processes	in	the	
context	of	the	speakers’	plans	of	intentional	action	towards	the	
collaborative	achievement	of	goal	self-	and	heteroconciliations.	The	
proactive	conceptual	architecture	of	the	theory	provides	a	four-stage	
model,	encompassing	the	projection	of	one	goal	and	the	formulation,	
execution,	and	checking	of	at	least	one	optimal	antefactual	abductive	
hypothesis	connecting	a	plausible	antecedent	action	with	the	projected	
consequential	state.	
More	recently,	in	the	scope	of	this	architecture,	I	have	been	conceiving	
speakers’	ostensive	processes	as	converting	practical	intentions	into	
informative	and	communicative	intentions.	So,	one	can	only	achieve	a	
practical	intention	collaboratively	through	the	recognition	the	speaker	
intends	to	make	mutually	manifest	or	more	manifest	a	certain	set	of	
assumptions	through	overtly	or	communicative	ostensive	stimuli1.	
Therefore,	communicative	stimuli	in	general—and	linguistic	utterances	in	
particular—contain	a	communicative	intention,	directed	by	an	
informational	intention,	directed	by	a	practical	intention.	
In	this	study,	I	analyze	potentialities	of	modeling	communicative	
interactions	considering	these	three	layers	of	intention.	So,	I	present	the	
goal-conciliation	abductive-deductive	architecture	in	a	case	of	self-
conciliation,	then	I	discuss	the	notion	of	intention	in	a	case	of	
heteroconciliation,	and	finally,	I	draw	some	considerations	about	the	notion	
of	intention	in	the	light	of	an	approach	to	communication	as	a	proactive	
agency.	
2 Theoretical Notes2 
In	goal-conciliation	theory,	I	assume	individuals	are	proactive	and,	
therefore,	able	to	formulate	plans	of	intentional	actions	toward	the	
achievement	of	their	goals	(RAUEN,	2014),	and	I	conceive	intention	as	a	
plan	of	action	the	organism	chooses	and	commits	itself	in	pursuing	a	goal	
(BRATMAN,	1989).	Thus,	I	include	in	the	scope	of	the	concept	of	intention	
both	the	goal	and	the	plan	to	achieve	it.	Also,	one	can	describe	and	explain	a	
plan	of	intentional	action	in	four	stages.	The	first	of	these	four	stages—
which	is	axiomatic—consists	of	projecting	a	goal	[1].	The	next	three	stages	
consist	of	formulating	[2],	performing	[3]	and	checking	[4]	at	least	one	
antefactual	abductive	hypothesis.	
The	first	three	stages	of	this	model	are	abductive.	In	the	case	of	an	
explanatory	abduction,	the	individual	starts	from	the	observation	of	a	fact	
 
1	See,	for	example,	Cataneo	and	Rauen	(2018),	Rauen	(2018),	Rauen	and	Luciano	(2017),	and	Rauen	and	Rauen	(2018,	2019).	
2	In	this	paper,	I	present	a	revised	and	updated	version	of	the	theory	as	settled	in	For	a	Goal-Conciliation	Theory:	Antefactual	
Abductive	Hypotheses	and	Proactive	Modelling	(RAUEN,	2014).	The	text	incorporates	several	improvements	developed	in	
recent	years	in	the	Research	Group	on	Cognitive	Pragmatics	at	the	University	of	Southern	Santa	Catarina	(Unisul).	
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(x	is	Q).	It	follows	from	this	observation	the	ex-post-facto	abduction	of	a	
hypothesis	of	a	nomological	connection	between	a	certain	cause	P	and	the	
fact	Q,	and	the	conclusion	this	cause	P	is	the	most	plausible	explanation	for	
the	emergence	of	the	fact	Q	(x	is	P).	Take	for	example	the	case	of	a	murder	
and	the	finding	that	the	weapon	used	in	the	crime	contains	the	fingerprints	
of	an	individual.	It	follows	that	the	most	plausible	suspect	is	the	individual	
whose	fingerprints	are	on	the	weapon.	
I	generalize	this	architecture	to	a	priori	cases,	in	which	an	individual	i	
can	be	conceived	as	someone	capable	of	projecting	into	a	certain	state	of	
goal	Q	in	the	future.	Thus,	a	description	like	x	is	Q	may	represent	a	certain	
state	x	in	the	future	that	will	satisfy	this	expectation	[stage	1],	remaining	to	
describe	and	explain	how	the	individual	i	achieves	such	a	state.	So,	I	
propose	that	the	individual	i	abducts	ex-ante-facto	a	hypothesis	there	is	a	
nomological	connection	between	an	antecedent	action	P	he/she	considers	
minimally	as	plausible	to	achieve	that	consequential	state	Q	[stage	2].	It	
follows	that	x	is	P,	and	individual	i	performs	the	action	P	in	the	expectation	
of	reaching	Q	[stage	3].	
Considering	the	last	three	stages	of	the	model,	the	architecture	is	also	
deductive.	This	is	because	one	can	conceive	the	antefactual	abductive	
hypothesis	[stage	2]	as	a	major	premise	and	the	antecedent	action	x	is	P	
[stage	3]	as	a	minor	premise	in	this	plan	of	intentional	action.	It	is	precisely	
in	the	scope	of	these	two	assumptions	one	deduces	the	conclusion	x	is	Q’3	
[stage	4].	
We	can	see	this	architecture	in	figure	1	below.	
Figure 1 – Goal-conciliation abductive-deductive architecture 
Abduction  [1]  Q  
 Deduction [2] P Q  
  [3] P   
  [4]  Q’  
Source: Rauen (2018, p. 14). 
Let	us	take	as	an	example	the	theoretical	notion	of	presumption	of	
optimal	relevance	in	Sperber	and	Wilson’s	(1986,	1995)	relevance	theory.	
Briefly,	relevance	theory	is	a	pragmatic-cognitive	approach	based	on	two	
principles:	the	cognitive	principle	the	human	mind	maximizes	the	inputs	to	
which	it	is	submitted;	and	the	communicative	principle	the	utterances	yield	
precise	expectations	of	relevance.	
Relevance	is	a	potential	property	of	these	inputs.	An	input	is	relevant	
when	the	positive	cognitive	effects	derived	from	its	processing	compensate	
the	efforts	expended	to	achieve	them:	strengthening	previous	assumptions,	
contradicting	and	eliminating	these	previous	assumptions,	or	yielding	
implications	derived	from	the	interaction	with	these	previous	assumptions.	
Thus,	ceteris	paribus,	relevance	is	greater	when	cognitive	effects	are	greater	
and/or	when	processing	efforts	are	smaller.	
The	theoretical	notion	of	presumption	of	optimal	relevance	stems	from	
the	communicative	principle	of	relevance,	according	to	which	
communication	stimuli	are	presumably	relevant;	just	as	the	communicative	
principle	itself	stems	from	the	cognitive	principle	of	maximizing	relevance.	
 
3	Q’	represents	the	goal	Q	achievement.	Strictly	speaking,	one	can	perform	the	antecedent	action	materially	or	simulate	it	
mentally.	In	any	case,	the	apostrophe	indicates	a	certain	displacement	between	the	initial	projection	of	the	goal	and	its	
achievement	in	the	context	of	the	abductive	hypothesis.	This	displacement	justifies	the	later	notion	of	conciliation.	
 
Memorare, Tubarão, v. 7, n. 2, maio/ago. 2020. ISSN: 2358-0593 
30 
An	utterance	is	presumed	to	be	optimally	relevant	when	it	is	(a)	at	least	
relevant	enough	to	justify	the	audience’s	processing	effort,	and	(b)	as	
relevant	as	possible	according	to	the	speakers’	abilities	and	preferences	
(SPERBER;	WILSON,	1995).	
It	follows	from	the	presumption	of	optimal	relevance	a	relevance-
theoretic	comprehension	procedure.	According	to	such	a	procedure,	the	
audience	must	follow	a	path	of	least	effort	in	computing	cognitive	effects:	
(a)	considering	interpretations	in	order	of	accessibility,	and	(b)	stopping	
when	the	expectation	of	relevance	is	satisfied.	
I	argue	this	architecture	corresponds	to	an	ex-post-facto	abduction4.	
The	reasoning	starts	from	the	fact	that	a	rational	speaker	has	produced	an	
optimally	relevant	utterance.	It	follows	the	abductive	hypothesis	the	
application	of	the	relevance-theoretic	comprehension	procedure	allows	the	
audience	to	choose	at	least	one	interpretation	that	fits	this	presumption	of	
optimal	relevance.	So,	the	audience	applies	the	procedure	and	deductively	
achieves	at	least	one	interpretation	consistent	with	such	an	expectation.	
Figure 2 – Presumption of optimal relevance as postfactual abductive-deductive architecture  
Abduction  [1]  Q – Relevant Interpretation  
 Deduction [2] P – Comprehension Procedure Q – Relevant Interpretation  
  [3] P – Comprehension Procedure   
  [4]  Q’ – Relevant Interpretation  
Source: My elaboration. 
In	order	to	model	an	antefactual	situation	without	communicative	
stimuli,	let	us	take	the	case	of	Peter,	who	is	faced	with	the	problem	of	
having	to	open	the	locked	door	of	his	own	house5.	
The	first	stage	of	modeling	consists	of	projecting	the	goal:	
[1]	The	individual	i	designs	a	goal	Q	at	the	time	t1;	
[1’]	Peter	i	designs	the	goal	Q	of	opening	the	locked	door	at	the	time	t1.	
The	formulation	captures	the	instant	t1	of	the	projection	of	the	goal	Q	
of	opening	the	locked	door;	so	that,	the	goal	Q	is	a	future	possibility	that	is	
not	yet	available.	
One	can	represent	this	stage	schematically	as	follows:	
[1]	 Q	 	 	 	 opening	the	door,	Peter	
The	second	stage	consists	of	formulating	at	least	one	antefactual	
abductive	hypothesis	to	achieve	the	goal	Q—the	plan	of	intentional	
action—namely:	
[2]	The	individual	i	abducts	an	optimal6	antefactual	hypothesis	Ha	to	achieve	
the	goal	Q	at	the	time	t2;	
 
4	In	other	words,	both	the	presumption	of	optimal	relevance	and	the	communicative	principle	of	relevance	are	nothing	more	
than	optimal	abductions	to	explain	the	ostensive	emergence	of	an	utterance.	
5	For	convenience,	I	present	in	this	text	a	simplified	version	of	the	example	provided	in	Rauen	(2014,	p.	598-603).	
6	I	have	adopted	the	notion	of	inference	to	the	best	solution	in	the	first	texts	of	the	theory	influenced	by	Harman’s	(1965)	
notion	of	inference	to	the	best	explanation.	More	recently,	I	have	used	a	less	restrictive	notion	of	inference	to	the	optimal	
solution.	This	displacement	is	essential	to	highlight	that	an	ad	hoc	solution	is	always	one	which	the	individual	believes	to	be	
better	in	his/her	contextual	constrictions	and	repertoires	of	preferences	and	abilities.	This	also	avoids	discussions	
throughout	an	epistemic	notion	of	a	better	solution,	which	is	not	the	case	in	goal-conciliation	theory.	Strictly	speaking,	
solutions	are	not	supposed	to	be	always	the	best,	but	those	plausible	in	the	context	of	these	constrictions	and	repertoires.	
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[2’]	Peter	i	abducts	the	optimal	antefactual	hypothesis	Ha	to	achieve	the	goal	Q	
of	opening	the	locked	door	at	the	time	t2.	
As	one	can	check,	the	output	of	the	formulation	(2’)	is	incomplete,	
because	it	does	not	identify	the	antecedent	action	P	Peter	will	consider	as	
plausible	to	achieve	the	consequent	state	Q	of	opening	the	locked	door.	To	
deal	with	this	gap,	let	us	consider	the	arbitrary	hypothesis	that	Peter’s	
encyclopedic	memory	contains	only	the	following	restricted	set	of	factual	
assumptions	S1-3:	
S1	–	Using	a	key	opens	locked	doors;	
S2	–	Calling	a	locksmith	opens	locked	doors;	
S3	–	Lowering	the	door	handle	opens	locked	doors.	
I	suggest	the	choice	of	an	optimal	antefactual	abductive	hypothesis	Ha	
meets	at	least	four	criteria	in	the	narrow	scope	of	factual	assumptions	S1-3.	
Consistent	with	the	first	criterion,	one	must	map	the	hypothesis	Ha	in	a	
hypothetical	formulation	“If	P,	then	Q,”	according	to	which,	minimally,	if	one	
performs	an	antecedent	action	P,	then	one	can	achieve	a	consequential	
state	Q.	As	we	can	see,	one	can	convert	all	the	factual	assumptions	S1-3	into	
such	a	formulation.	
Consistent	with	the	second	criterion,	the	hypothesis	Ha	must	contain	a	
plausible	antecedent	action	P	to	open	the	door.	The	factual	assumptions	S1-3	
are	executable	actions.	However,	“lowering	the	door	handle”	in	assumption	
S3—suitable	in	cases	of	unlocked	doors—is	insufficient	and	rationally	
useless	to	open	a	door	Peter	knows	is	locked.	
Consistent	with	the	third	criterion,	the	hypothesis	Ha	must	be	an	
optimal	solution	to	achieve	the	goal	Q,	and	with	the	fourth	criterion,	it	must	
be	the	first	assumption	consistent	with	the	principle	of	relevance.	S2	
“Calling	a	locksmith”	is	supposed	to	achieve	the	goal,	but	it	is	hard	to	see	
how	such	a	solution	is	the	first	one	to	come	to	Peter’s	mind	in	front	of	his	
locked	front-door.	
The	factual	assumption	S1	of	“using	a	key”	would	be	an	optimal	
solution	in	this	restricted	context	of	assumptions	S1-3,	since	(i)	it	is	mapped	
in	a	hypothetical	formulation,	(ii)	it	is	a	plausible	action,	(iii)	it	is	the	lowest	
processing	cost	hypothesis	in	the	face	of	the	fixed	effect	of	opening	a	locked	
door,	and	(iv)	it	meets	the	criterion	of	optimal	solution,	because	there	is	no	
reason	to	call	a	locksmith	when	someone	has	a	key	to	open	the	door.	
The	result	of	this	comparison	is	the	following	antefactual	abductive	
hypothesis:	
[2”]	Peter	i	abducts	that	if	Peter	i	uses	the	key,	then	Peter	i	will	open	the	
locked	door.	
One	can	represent	the	output	of	[2”]—plan	of	intentional	action—as	
follows:	
[1]	 Q	 	 	 	 opening	the	door,	Peter	
[2]	P	 Q	 using	the	key,	Peter	 opening	the	door,	Peter	
The	third	stage	refers	to	the	probable	execution	of	the	antecedent	
action	P7:	
 
7	Although	I	model	a	carried-out	situation	here,	one	can	mentally	simulate	both	execution	and	checking	stages.	
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[3a]	the	individual	i	performs	P	to	achieve	Q	at	the	time	t3;	or	
[3b]	the	individual	i	does	not	perform	P	to	achieve	Q	at	the	time	t3.	
In	the	third	stage,	I	have	been	arguing	the	foreground	schema	will	be	
active,	such	that	Peter	will	tend	to	use	the	key	to	open	the	locked	door8.	
We	can	see	the	active	output	of	the	third	stage—intentional	action—
below:	
[3’]	Peter	i	uses	the	key	to	Peter	i	open	the	locked	door	at	t3.	
Or,	more	schematically:	
[1]	 Q	 	 	 	 opening	the	door,	Peter	
[2]	P	 Q	 using	the	key,	Peter	 opening	the	door,	Peter	
[3]	P	 	 Peter	uses	the	key	 	
The	fourth	stage	consists	of	deductively	checking	the	hypothetical	
formulation:	
(4a)	The	individual	i	checks	the	achievement	Q’	at	t4	considering	[2]	e	[3a];	or,	
(4b)	The	individual	i	checks	the	achievement	¬Q’	at	t4	considering	[2]	e	[3b].	
In	the	fourth	stage,	the	agent	evaluates	or	monitors	the	outcome	of	the	
antecedent	action	P	in	the	deductive	scope	of	the	formulation	“If	P,	then	Q,”	
so	that	Peter	checks	if	the	door	opens	with	the	key	in	the	active	scenario9.	
We	can	see	the	output	of	the	fourth	stage	[4a]	below:	
(4’)	Peter	i	checks	the	door	opening	consecution	at	t4.	
Or,	more	schematically:	
[1]	 	 Q	 	 	 	 opening	the	door,	Peter	
[2]	 P	 Q	 using	the	key,	Peter	 opening	the	door,	Peter	
[3]	 P	 	 Peter	uses	the	key	 	
[4]	 	 Q’	 	 	 	 Peter	opens	the	door	
Precisely	in	the	fourth	stage,	I	propose	two	essential	concepts	in	goal-
conciliation	theory:	goal-conciliation	and	hypothesis-confirmation.	
I	define	by	goal-conciliation	a	certain	situation	in	which	the	state	Q’	at	
t4	satisfies	the	goal	Q	at	t1	(RAUEN,	2014,	p.	603).	Accordingly,	the	outcome	
of	the	action	P	at	t4	is	sufficiently	like	to	the	consecution	projected	by	the	
individual	i	in	t1.	
Given	this	concept,	one	can	observe	four	possibilities:	(a)	active	
conciliation,	when	the	individual	i	performs	the	action	P	in	the	scope	of	the	
hypothesis	Ha,	and	the	state	Q’	at	the	time	t4	conciliates	with	the	goal	Q	at	
the	time	t1;	(b)	active	non-conciliation,	when	the	individual	i	performs	
action	P	in	the	scope	of	hypothesis	Ha,	and	the	state	Q’	at	the	time	t4	does	
not	conciliate	with	the	goal	Q	at	the	time	t1;	(c)	passive	conciliation,	when	
the	individual	i	does	not	perform	the	action	P	in	the	scope	of	hypothesis	Ha,	
and	the	state	Q’	at	the	time	t4	even	so	conciliates	with	the	goal	Q	at	the	time	
 
8	I	follow	Johnson-Laird	and	Byrne’s	(2002)	argument	that,	in	the	context	of	the	theory	of	mental	models,	negative	models	
tend	to	be	neglected	or	forgotten.	Passivity	can	occur	when,	for	example,	the	agent	is	unable	to	perform	the	action	P,	or	there	
are	conflicts,	hesitations,	fears,	personal	sabotages,	which	put	goals	and/or	plans	in	suspicion.	
9	Or	Peter	checks	if	the	door	does	not	open	when	he	does	not	use	the	key	in	the	passive	scenario.	
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t1;	(d)	passive	non-conciliation,	when	the	individual	i	does	not	perform	the	
action	P	in	the	scope	of	hypothesis	Ha,	and	the	state	Q’	at	the	time	t4	does	
not	conciliate	with	the	goal	Q	at	the	time	t1.		
In	simple	terms:	in	an	active	conciliation	(a),	Peter	uses	the	key,	and	
the	door	opens;	in	an	active	non-conciliation	(b),	Peter	uses	the	key,	but	the	
door	does	not	open;	in	a	passive	conciliation	(c),	Peter	does	not	use	the	key,	
and	even	so	the	door	opens;	and	in	a	passive	non-conciliation	(d),	Peter	does	
not	use	the	key,	and	the	door	does	not	open.	
We	can	see	the	four	situations	in	figure	3:	
Figure 3 – Possibilities of goal-achievements 
Stages Active Conciliation (a) Active Non-Conciliation (b) Passive Conciliation (c) Passive Non-Conciliation (d) 
[1]  Q  Q  Q  Q 
[2] P Q P Q P Q P Q 
[3] P  P  ¬P  ¬P  
[4]  Q’  ¬Q’  Q’  ¬Q’ 
Source: Rauen (2014:604). 
By	confirmation	of	an	antefactual	abductive	hypothesis	Ha,	I	define	the	
case	in	which	the	state	Q’	at	the	time	t4	satisfies	the	hypothesis	Ha	at	the	
time	t2	(RAUEN,	2014,	p.	604).	Accordingly,	the	consequence	of	the	action	P	
reinforces	the	antefactual	abductive	hypothesis	Ha	the	antecedent	action	P	
minimally	enables	the	consequent	state	Q.	
The	evaluation	of	an	abductive	antefactual	hypothesis	Ha	depends	on	
the	degree	of	confidence	or	strength	attributed	to	it	by	individuals,	
according	to	the	following	scale:	
a) categorical	antefactual	abductive	hypothesis.	It	is	a	P⟺Q	
formulation,	whose	consecution	is	true	whenever	P	and	Q	are	
true10.	Here,	P	and	Q	are	sufficient,	necessary,	and	certain,	and	one	
can	only	assume	active	conciliation	(1a)11;	
b) biconditional	antefactual	abductive	hypothesis.	It	is	a	P⟷Q	
formulation,	whose	consecution	is	true	whenever	P	and	Q	are	or	
true,	or	false.	Here,	the	mere	consideration	of	the	¬P⟶¬Q	
possibility	weakens	the	initial	hypothetical	categorical	formulation.	
Since	P	and	Q	are	now	sufficient	and	necessary,	but	they	are	not	
certain,	one	can	assume	passive	non-conciliations	(1d);	
c) conditional	antefactual	abductive	hypothesis.	It	is	a	P⟶Q	
formulation,	whose	consecution	is	true	whenever	the	antecedent	
action	P	is	sufficient,	but	it	is	not	necessary	for	the	consequent	state	
Q—material	implication.	Here,	one	can	also	assume	passive	
conciliations	(1c);	
d) enabling	antefactual	abductive	hypothesis.	It	is	a	P⟵Q12	formulation	
whose	consecution	is	true	whenever	the	antecedent	action	P	is	
necessary,	but	it	is	not	sufficient	to	achieve	the	consequent	state	Q.	
 
10	The	notation	‘⟺’	captures	the	idea	of	a	sufficient,	necessary	and	certain	connection	between	the	antecedent	action	and	the	
consequent	state.	
11	I	state	the	hypothesis	that	antefactual	abductive	hypotheses	Ha	emerge	by	default	as	categorical	both	in	conscious	and	
unconscious	instances	(RAUEN,	2014,	p.	605).	Accordingly,	the	abductive	mechanism	works	either	in	innate	or	learned	automatic	
situations,	when	the	individual	does	not	have	conscious	access	to	the	mechanism,	as	in	situations	of	deliberation,	when	the	
hypothesis	itself	emerges	as	relevant.	
12	I	loan	the	terminology	from	Johnson-Laird	and	Byrne	(2002,	p.	661).		
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If	P	enables,	but	does	not	guarantee	Q,	one	can	also	assume	active	
non-conciliations	(1b)13;	
e) tautological	antefactual	abductive	hypothesis.	It	is	a	P¾Q	
formulation14,	whose	consecution	is	true	in	cases	where	both	P	and	
Q	are	sufficient,	but	they	are	not	necessary,	modeling	situations	like	
“If	P,	then	possibly	Q,”	and	assuming	all	kinds	of	achievements.	
We	can	summarize	these	possibilities	in	the	figure	4	bellow:	
Figure 4 – Possibilities of success in achieving intentional action plans 15 
Types of 
Conciliation 
Antecedent 
Action 
Consequent 
State 
Categorical 
Hypothesis 
Biconditional 
Hypothesis 
Conditional 
Hypothesis 
Enabling 
Hypothesis 
Tautological 
Hypothesis 
 P Q P⟺Q P⟷Q  P⟶Q  P⟵Q  P¾Q  
(a) Active Conciliation + + + + + + + 
(b) Active Non-Conciliation  + − − − − + + 
(c) Passive Conciliation − + − − + − + 
(d) Passive Non-Conciliation  − − − + + + + 
Source: Rauen (2018, adapted). 
Considering	a	categorical	abductive	antefactual	hypothesis	scenario,	
for	example,	we	can	describe	the	different	accomplishments	as	follows.	In	
an	active	conciliation,	Peter	achieves	the	goal	Q	of	opening	the	door	and	
confirms	the	antefactual	abductive	hypothesis	Ha	the	key	opens	the	door.	
This	hypothesis	is	strengthened	and	dynamically	stored	in	the	encyclopedic	
memory	as	a	factual	assumption	to	be	triggered	in	future	situations.	
	
[1]   Q Peter designs opening the door; 
[2] P Û Q Certainly, if Peter uses the key, then Peter opens the door; 
[3] P   Peter uses the key; 
[4]   Q’ Peter opens the door. 
	
In	an	active	non-conciliation	(1b),	Peter	cannot	open	the	door	*¬Q’,	
even	using	the	key.	So,	the	key	is	necessary,	but	it	is	not	sufficient	to	open	
it—enabling	hypothesis	P⟵Q	16.	
	
[1]   Q Peter designs opening the door; 
[2] P Û Q Certainly, if Peter uses the key, then Peter opens the door; 
[3] P   Peter uses the key; 
[4]   *¬Q’ Peter does not open the door; 
[5] P ¬ Q The key is necessary, but it is not sufficient to open the door. 
	
In	cases	of	determination,	the	goal	Q	is	stronger	than	the	achievement	
¬Q’.	So,	the	processing	cannot	stop	at	stage	[5].	To	maintain	the	goal’s	
pursuit,	I	suggest	matching	Q	and	¬Q’	with	an	introduction-and	rule,17	
 
13	When	I	accept	enabling	hypotheses	and,	later,	tautological	hypotheses,	I	abandon	the	epistemic	claim	that	true	premises	
necessarily	generate	true	conclusions.	The	notation	‘⟵’	captures	the	idea	of	a	necessary,	but	not	sufficient	connection	between	the	
antecedent	action	and	the	consequent	state.	
14	I	also	loan	this	terminology	from	Johnson-Laird	and	Byrne	(2002,	p.	660-661).	The	notation	‘¾’	captures	the	idea	of	no	certain,	
necessary	or	sufficient	connection	between	the	terms	of	the	proposition.	
15	These	achievements	were	presented	in	earlier	versions	of	the	theory	in	terms	of	a	truth	table.	The	current	version	avoids	
compromises	with	epistemological	aspects	and	reinforces	compromises	with	a	practical	rationality.	
16	By	the	way,	it	is	worth	emphasizing	this	active	non-conciliation	is	relevant	both	when	it	constrains	the	individual	to	seek	
new	solutions,	and	when	it	leads	him	to	formulate	post-factual	or	explanatory	abductive	hypotheses	to	deal	with	the	setback.	
17	I	include	an	introductory	rule	despite	Sperber	and	Wilson’s	(1986,	1995)	argument	the	relevance-theoretic	deductive	
mechanism	works	exclusively	by	elimination	rules.	This	introduction	rule	does	not	incorporate	arbitrary	material	since	it	is	
the	resumption	of	the	goal	Q.	Luciano	(2014)	develops	the	argument	in	her	master’s	thesis	Relevance	and	Goal-Conciliation:	
Logical	Adequacy	and	Empirical	Plausibility.	
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and—since	both	propositions	are	true—I	suggest	keeping	Q	by	elimination-
and	rule.	Once	the	goal	is	maintained,	a	new	problem	and	a	new	abductive-
deductive	cycle	emerges18.	
	
[6] Q Ù ¬Q’ 1, 4 by introduction-and; 
[7]   Q by elimination-and. 
	
In	a	passive	non-conciliation	(1d)—when,	for	example,	Peter	does	not	
find	the	key	*¬P19	to	open	the	door—one	has	two	cognitive	effects:	the	
weakening	of	the	hypothesis,	which	now	turns	out	to	be	biconditional	
P«Q20,	and	the	implied	conclusion	the	door	cannot	be	opened	¬Q	in	the	
context	of	this	new	hypothesis.	Once	more,	if	the	goal	Q	is	stronger	than	the	
achievement	¬Q’,	the	processing	can	go	on	at	the	stages	[6-7].	
	
[1]   Q Peter designs opening the door; 
[2] P Û Q Certainly, if Peter uses the key, then Peter opens the door; 
[3] *¬P   Peter cannot use the key; 
[4] P « Q If and only if Peter uses the key, then Peter opens the door; 
[5]   ¬Q Peter will not open the door; 
[6] Q Ù ¬Q’ 1, 5 by introduction-and; 
[7]   Q by elimination-and. 
	
In	a	passive	conciliation	(1c),	the	door	opens	despite	Peter’s	
passivity—someone	opens	the	door	on	the	other	side	without	Peter	having	
used	the	key,	for	example.	In	this	scenario,	Peter	concludes	the	key	is	
sufficient,	but	it	is	not	necessary	to	open	the	door	P⟶Q.	As	Peter	achieves	
his	goal,	it	is	likely	the	door	will	no	longer	be	relevant,	and	he	will	pay	
attention	to	other	goals	or	demands21.	
	
[1]   Q Peter designs opening the door (internal goal); 
[2] P Û Q Certainly, if Peter uses the key, then Peter opens the door; 
[3] *¬P   Peter does not use the key; 
[4] P « Q If and only if Peter uses the key, then Peter opens the door; 
[5]   *Q’ The door was opened without the key (accident/surprise); 
[6] P ® Q The key is sufficient, but it is not necessary to open the door. 
 
3 Collaborative Goal-Heteroconciliation 
In	the	previous	section,	I	model	what	I	call	goal-self-conciliation.	Peter	
has	designed	opening	the	door	himself	and	has	checked	himself	whether	
the	key	would	open	it.	However,	more	than	one	individual	can	trigger	
conciliation	processes,	setting	up	situations	in	which	it	is	necessary	to	
coordinate	common	goals	and	sub-goals.	
Let	us	take,	for	example,	the	case	where	Peter	meets	the	same	closed	
door,	but	now	Anne	has	the	key	to	open	it.	In	this	situation,	for	Peter	to	
open	the	door	with	the	key	Q,	he	needs	to	use	Anne’s	key	P;	and	for	Peter	to	
use	Anne’s	key	P,	he	needs	Anne	to	get	the	key	to	him	O.	22	
	
 
18	According	to	the	restricted	set	of	assumptions	S1-3,	calling	a	locksmith	could	be	raised	as	an	abductive	hypothesis	Ha.	
19	The	asterisk	‘*’	represents	a	problem-situation.	
20	I	claim	it	does	not	follow	from	the	rejection	of	the	categorical	degree	of	the	hypothesis	P⟺Q	that	one	rejects	the	
biconditional	hypothesis	P⟷Q.	This	ad	hoc	flexibility	precisely	characterizes	the	architecture	I	develop	here.	
21	This	sudden	conciliation,	however,	may	also	require	a	post-factual	explanation—when	involuntary—,	or	even	source	of	
new	problems—when	inaction	stems	from	hesitations,	fears,	etc.	(RAUEN,	2014,	p.	608).	
22	The	next	formulation—with	goals	and	sub-goals	only—is	a	simplified	version	of	the	one	presented	in	the	self-conciliation.		
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[1] ... ... Q – opening the door, Peter 
[2] ... P – using the key, Peter 
[3] O – giving the key, Anne 
[4] O – Anne gives the key   
[5] ... P’ – Peter uses the key 
[6] ... ... Q’ – Peter opens the door 
	
The	obvious	obstacle	in	this	context	is	that	the	practical	goal	O	that	
Anne	gives	the	key	to	Peter	needs	to	be	communicated23.	For	that,	I	
propose	three	layers	of	intentions:	a	practical	intention	that	superordinates	
an	information	intention,	an	information	intention	that	superordinates	a	
communicative	intention,	and	a	communicative	intention	itself24.	
Here,	the	practical	intention	N	that	Peter	asking	for	the	key—as	a	way	
of	achieving	the	highest	practical	intentions	O,	P	and	Q	of	Anne	gives	the	
key	and	Peter	using	the	key	to	open	the	door—superordinates	an	
informational	intention	M	to	make	manifest	or	more	manifest	an	
information	set	{I}	consistent	with	this	practical	intention	N25.	This	
informative	intention	M,	in	turn,	superordinates	a	communicative	intention	
L,	through	an	open	ostensive	stimulus,	to	make	mutually	manifest	or	more	
manifest	to	both,	Anne	and	Peter,	Peter	makes	manifest	this	set	of	
information	{I}	consistent	with	the	practical	intention	N,	which	
superordinates	this	chain	of	intentions.	Finally,	consistent	with	this	
practical	intention	N,	which	superordinates	the	chain	of	intentions,	Peter	
produces	an	open	ostensive	stimulus	that	makes	mutually	manifest	or	
more	manifest	to	both,	Anne	and	Peter,	he	makes	manifest	this	set	of	
information	{I},	the	communicative	intention	L	itself.	
One	can	see	this	chain	of	intentions	below:	
	
[1] ... ... ... ... ... Q – opening the door, Peter; 
[2] ... ... ... ... P – using the key, Peter; 
[3] ... ... ... O – giving the key, Anne; 
[4] ... ... N – asking for the key, Peter; 
[5] ... M – informing the asking, Peter; 
[6] L – communicating the asking, Peter; 
[7] L – Peter communicates the asking; 
[8] ... M’ – Peter informs the asking; 
[9] ... ... N’ – Peter asks for the key; 
[10] ... ... ... O’ – Anne gives the key; 
[11] ... ... ... ... P’ – Peter uses the key; 
[12] ... ... ... ... ... Q’ – Peter opens the door. 
	
In	this	case,	given	Peter’s	preferences—he	wants	to	open	the	door—
and	abilities—his	expertise	in	interacting	with	Anne—,	Peter	could	say	
what	follows:	
Peter	–	Could	you	give	me	the	key?	
From	Anne’s	point	of	view,	the	first	step	is	mobilizing	the	relevance-
theoretic	comprehension	procedure.	Following	a	path	of	minimal	effort,	
 
23	According	to	Lindsay	and	Gorayska’s	(2004,	p.	69)	formal	definition	of	goal-dependent	relevance,	“P	is	relevant	to	G	if	and	
only	if	G	is	a	goal	and	P	is	an	essential	element	of	any	plan	that	is	sufficient	to	achieve	G”.	So,	any	ostensive-communicational	
stimulus	is	not	relevant	by	itself,	but	relevant	in	a	context	that	fits	his/her	purposes	or	fits	others’	purposes.	
24	On	this	three-layers	intentional	modeling,	see	Bez	(2016),	Caldeira	(2016),	Cataneo	e	Rauen	(2018),	Luciano	(2018),	Rauen	
e	Rauen	(2018),	Rauen	e	Ribeiro	(2016,	2017).	
25	On	the	notions	of	manifestability	and	mutual	manifestability,	see	Sperber	and	Wilson	(1995,	p.	38-46).	
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Anne	would	fit	the	linguistic	formulation	of	Peter’s	utterance	into	a	logical	
form	and	elaborate	the	respective	explicature26.	
(1a)	Linguistic	Form:	Could	you	give	me	the	key?	
(1b)	Logical	form:	(can	give	someone,	something,	to	someone).	
(1c)	Explicature:	could	you	[ANNE]	give	me	[TO	PETER]	the	[FRONT	DOOR]	key.	
(1d)	Expanded	explicature:	PETER	WANTS	TO	KNOW	IF	ANNE	CAN	GIVE	TO	PETER	THE	
FRONT	DOOR	KEY.	
According	to	relevance	theory,	there	are	three	essential	questions	the	
audience	must	answer	to	identify	the	speaker’s	meaning:	what	did	the	
speaker	intend	to	communicate	explicitly;	what	did	the	speaker	intend	to	
communicate	implicitly;	and	what	is	an	appropriate	context	to	use	in	
identifying	both	the	explicit	and	implicit	meaning	(WILSON,	2004).	
The	explicature	(1d)	corresponds	to	the	explicit	meaning	of	Peter’s	
utterance	(1a),	but	it	does	not	correspond	to	the	implicit	meaning	made	
manifest	or	more	manifest	by	its	utterance	yet.	To	obtain	the	implicit	
meaning,	it	is	necessary	for	Anne	to	be	able	to	infer	Peter	wants	her	to	give	
the	key.	For	that,	Anne	must	be	able	to	produce,	among	other	chains	of	
inferences,	the	following	chain	of	inferences:	
S1	–	The	front-door	is	locked	(implied	premise	from	the	context);	
S2	–	Peter	wants	to	know	if	Anne	can	give	Peter	the	front-door	key	(implied	
premise	from	Peter’s	utterance	explicature);	
S3	–	Peter	probably	asks	for	Anne	her	front-door	key	(implied	conclusion:	
S1ÙS2⟶S3	by	conjunctive	modus	ponens);	
S4	–	Peter	probably	wants	to	open	the	front-door	with	Anne’s	front-door	key	
(implied	conclusion:	S3⟶S4	by	modus	ponens);	
S5	–	Peter	probably	wants	Anne	to	give	the	front-door	key	to	Peter	to	open	the	
front-door	with	Anne’s	front-door	key	(implied	conclusion:	S3ÙS4®S5	by	
conjunctive	modus	ponens).	
Only	when	Anne	infers	the	supposition	S3	Peter	probably	asks	for	
Anne	to	give	him	the	front-door	key—practical	intention	N—she	can	give	
the	key	to	Peter	and,	thereby,	achieve	Peter’s	practical	intention	O.	
S5	–	Peter	probably	wants	Anne	to	give	the	front-door	key	to	Peter	to	open	the	
front-door	with	Anne’s	front-door	key	(implied	premise);	
S6	–	Anne	should	probably	give	the	front-door	key	for	Peter	(implied	
conclusion	S5⟶S6	by	modus	ponens).	
In	other	words,	based	on	Peter’s	plan	of	intentional	action,	he	
heteroconciliates	three	layers	of	intention	when	Anne	collaboratively	
provided	the	front-door	key.	Concerning	the	communicative	intention	L,	it	
was	up	to	Pedro	make	mutually	manifest	or	more	manifest	his	desire	to	
inform	the	set	of	information	{I}	of	knowing	if	Anne	could	give	the	front-
door	key;	and	Anne	had	to	make	the	utterance	relevant	enough	to	process	
it.	Concerning	the	informative	intention	M,	it	was	up	to	Pedro	to	inform	the	
set	of	information	{I}	of	knowing	whether	Anne	could	give	the	front-door	
key;	and	Anne	had	to	trigger	the	comprehension	procedure	to	yield	the	
 
26	On	the	descriptive	methodology,	see,	for	example,	Rauen	(2011,	2009).		
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correct	interpretation	of	Peter’s	utterance.	Concerning	the	practical	
intention	N,	it	was	up	to	Peter	to	suggest	the	correct	inference	in	the	
context	was	he	was	asking	for	the	key.	
In	short,	for	Peter	to	open	the	door	with	Anne’s	key,	a	complex	chain	
of	heteroconciliations	has	entered	the	scene.	For	that	to	be	possible,	both	
Peter	and	Anne	should	be	able	to	monitor,	each	one	in	his	way,	the	course	
of	actions—self	conciliations27.	
Figure 5 – Basic scheme for goal self- and heteroconciliations 
Peter    Anne 
Q ¬ Heteroconciliation ® Q 
­    ­ 
Self-conciliation    Self-conciliation 
¯    ¯ 
Q’ ¬ Heteroconciliation ® Q’ 
Source: Rauen (2014, p. 613). 
However,	this	chain	of	inferences	can	fail	in	different	ways,	because	
they	depend	on	the	ostensive	stimulus	that	makes	up	the	lower-level	action	
in	the	chain	of	sub-goals	and	goals.	Strictly	speaking,	utterances	act	as	
enabling	abductive	antefactual	hypotheses	P⟵Q,	since,	for	the	most	part,	
although	necessary,	they	are	not	sufficient	for	the	heteroconciliation	of	
practical	intentions.	
Let	us	consider	Anne’s	verbal	and	non-verbal	reactions	(2a-2h)	to	
Peter’s	question	to	see	how	to	model	these	failures	in	terms	of	goal-
conciliation.	
	
(2a)	Anne	says	nothing.	
(2b)	Anne	says,	“What?”	
(2c)	Anne	says,	“I	can,”	but	does	not	provide	the	key.	
(2d)	Anne	says,	“I	do	not	have	[the	key]”	and	does	not	provide	the	key.	
(2e)	Anne	says,	“No”	and	does	not	provide	the	key.	
(2f)	Anne	says,	“You	can	let	me	open	it”	and	open	the	door.	
(2g)	Anne	says	nothing	and	gives	the	front-door	key	to	Peter.	
(2h)	Anne	says,	“Take	it”	and	give	the	key	to	Peter.	
	
When	Anne	does	not	say	anything	(2a),	one	of	the	plausible	
explanatory	hypotheses	He	is	the	ostensive	stimulus	was	not	relevant	
enough	to	get	her	attention.	In	this	case,	a	failure	to	perform	the	antecedent	
action	L	of	communicating	the	request—communicative	intention—has	
compromised	the	achievement	of	the	sub-goal	M	of	informing	the	
request—informational	intention—and,	consequently,	of	the	highest-level	
sub-goal	of	Anne	to	provide	the	key—practical	intention	N.	Considering	
such	inconsistencies	and	the	probable	maintenance	of	the	goal,	Peter	can	
reiterate	or	even	modify	the	request.	
	
[1] ... ... ... ... ... Q – opening the door, Peter; 
[2] ... ... ... ... P – using the key, Peter; 
[3] ... ... ... O – giving the key, Anne; 
[4] ... ... N – asking for the key, Peter; 
[5] ... M – informing the asking, Peter; 
[6] L – communicating the asking, Peter; 
[7] ¬L – Peter does not communicate the asking; 
 
27	This	modeling	is	in	line	with	Tomasello	and	colleagues’	(2005,	p.	680-681)	argument	that	the	crucial	difference	between	
human	cognition	and	the	cognition	of	other	species	is	the	human	capacity	to	participate	in	collaborative	activities	with	
common	goals	and	intentions—shared	intentionality	or	we-intentionality.	
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[8] ... ¬M’ – Peter does not inform the asking; 
[9] ... ... ¬N’ – Peter does not ask for the key; 
[10] ... ... ... ¬O’ – Anne does not give the key; 
[11] ... ... ... ... ¬P’ – Peter does not use the key; 
[12] ... ... ... ... ... ¬Q’ – Peter does not open the door. 
	
When	Anne	says	“What?”	(2b),	one	of	the	plausible	explanatory	
hypotheses	He	is	the	ostensive	stimulus	was	sufficiently	relevant	to	get	her	
attention,	but	it	was	insufficient	to	be	fully	processed.	In	such	a	case,	a	
partial	failure	to	perform	the	antecedent	action	L	to	communicate	the	
request—communicative	intention—has	compromised	the	achievement	of	
the	sub-goal	M	of	informing	it—informational	intention—and,	
consequently,	of	the	highest-level	sub-goal	of	asking	for	the	key—practical	
intention	N.	The	reiteration	or	modification	of	the	request	as	represented	in	
the	situation	(2a)	follows	from	these	active	non-conciliations	and	the	
maintenance	of	the	goal.	
Higher-level	practical	intentions	can	fail	to	be	achieved	even	in	
contexts	in	which	the	ostensive	stimulus	L	of	communicating	the	request—
communicative	intention—does	not	compromise	the	achievement	of	the	
sub-goals	M	and	N—informational	and	lower-level	practical	intention	of	
inform	and	ask	for	the	key.	For	example,	the	fact	Anne	does	not	say	
anything	(2a)	may	be	an	indication	she	had	achieved	these	intentions	but	
failed	to	pretend	she	had	not	paid	attention.	Here,	the	ostensive	stimulus	
was	sufficiently	relevant	to	be	worth	processing,	to	enable	the	correct	
mobilization	of	the	comprehension	procedure	and	to	obtain	the	
appropriate	inferences;	but	Anne	refuses	to	cooperate	with	Peter	for	some	
reason.28		
	
[1] ... ... ... ... ... Q – opening the door, Peter; 
[2] ... ... ... ... P – using the key, Peter; 
[3] ... ... ... O – giving the key, Anne; 
[4] ... ... N – asking for the key, Peter; 
[5] ... M – informing the asking, Peter; 
[6] L – communicating the asking, Peter; 
[7] L – Peter communicates the asking; 
[8] ... M’ – Peter informs the asking; 
[9] ... ... N’ – Peter asks for the key; 
[10] ... ... ... ¬O’ – Anne does not give the key; 
[11] ... ... ... ... ¬P’ – Peter does not use the key; 
[12] ... ... ... ... ... ¬Q’ – Peter does not open the door. 
	
A	more	complex	situation	happens	when	Anne	says,	“I	can,”	but	does	
not	provide	the	key	(2c).	Supposedly,	Peter	achieves	the	intentions	L,	M	and	
N;	but	it	is	unclear	why	Peter	does	not	achieve	the	practical	intention	O.	
From	such	a	situation,	there	are	a	lot	of	possibilities	ranging	from	the	plain	
lack	of	cooperation	to	the	inability	to	mobilize	the	correct	inferences—
misunderstanding.	
When	Anne	says,	“I	do	not	have	[the	key]”	and	does	not	provide	the	
key	(2d),	or	when	Anne	says,	“No”	and	does	not	provide	the	key	(2e),	the	
most	plausible	explanatory	hypothesis	He—assuming	her	cooperation—is	
that	Peter	achieves	the	intentions	L,	M	and	N,	but	does	not	achieve	the	
practical	intention	O	because	Anne	does	not	have	the	key.	
 
28	The	sequence	of	such	a	situation	is,	as	might	be	expected,	unpredictable.	
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When	Anne	says,	“You	can	let	me	open”	and	open	the	door	(2f),	the	
most	plausible	explanatory	hypothesis	He—assuming	her	cooperation—is	
that	Peter	achieves	the	intentions	L,	M	and	N,	but	Anne	figures	out	a	
different	practical	intention.	This	active	non-conciliation	suggests	that	Anne	
has	correctly	mobilized	the	relevance-theoretic	comprehension	procedure,	
in	such	a	way	that	she	has	found	the	explicature	(1d),	but	she	has	
integrated	it	into	an	inferential	chain	whose	outcome—Peter	wants	Anne	
to	open	the	door—diverges	from	that	one	expected	by	him.	Let	us	see:	
	
S1	–	The	front-door	is	locked	(implied	premise	from	the	context);	
S2	–	Peter	wants	to	know	if	Anne	can	give	Peter	the	front-door	key	(implied	
premise	from	Peter’s	utterance	explicature);	
S3	–	Peter	probably	wants	Anne	to	open	the	door	(implied	conclusion:	
S1ÙS2⟶S3	by	conjunctive	modus	ponens/implied	premise);	
S4	–	Anne	should	probably	open	the	door	(implied	conclusion:	S3⟶S4	by	
modus	ponens).	
	
Finally,	only	when	Anne	does	not	say	anything	or	when	Anne	says,	
“Take	it”	and	provides	the	key	to	Peter	(2g-2h)—since	she	allows	Peter	to	
use	key	P	to	open	door	Q—Peter	conciliates	all	the	intentions	at	stake—
communicative,	informative,	and	practical.		
4 Discussion 
In	the	last	two	sections,	I	presented	a	revised	and	updated	version	of	
how	goal-conciliation	theory	deals	with	cases	of	self-	and	
heteroconciliation,	stressing	the	pertinence	of	describing	and	explaining	
communicational	exchanges	in	terms	of	communicational,	informative	and	
practical	intentions	as	a	collaborative	agency.	In	this	section,	I	propose	to	
draw	some	considerations	on	this	triad	of	intentions	itself.	
In	Meaning,	Grice	(1957)	has	argued	the	concept	of	intention	is	crucial	
to	deal	with	the	processing	of	non-natural	meaning	of	language.	In	this	text,	
to	intend	to	say	something	with	an	utterance	corresponds	to	wish	the	
recognition	of	this	intention	yields	certain	behaviors	in	the	audience.	
“A	meantNN	something	by	x”	is	(roughly)	equivalent	to	“A	intended	the	
utterance	of	x	to	produce	some	effect	in	an	audience	by	means	of	the	
recognition	of	this	intention”.	(GRICE,	1957,	p.	385	apud	STRAWSON,	1971,	p.	
446,	Strawson’s	quotes).	
As	Strawson	(1971)	develops	Grice’s	seminal	idea,	the	speaker	must	
fulfil	three	intentions	to	mean	non-naturally	something	by	a	stimulus	%.	
According	to	the	intention	(a),	the	utterance	of	%	must	yield	a	response	in	
the	audience;	according	to	the	intention	(b),	the	audience	must	recognize	
the	intention	(a);	according	to	intent	(c),	the	recognition	of	the	intention	(a)	
must	work	at	least	in	part	as	a	reason	for	the	audience	to	give	that	
response.	
S	non-naturally	means	something	by	an	utterance	x	if	S	intends	(a)	to	produce	
by	uttering	x	a	certain	response	(r)	in	an	audience	A	and	intends	(b)	that	A	
shall	recognize	S’s	intention	(a)	and	intends	(c)	that	this	recognition	on	the	
part	of	A	of	S’s	intention	(a)	shall	function	as	A’s	reason,	or	a	part	of	his	
reason,	for	his	response	r.	(STRAWSON,	1971,	p.	446,	adapted)29.	
 
29	I	have	translated	Strawson’s	original	notations	(i1),	(i2),	and	(i3)	into	(a),	(b),	and	(c),	respectively,	in	order	to	make	easier	
correspondences	with	Sperber	and	Wilson’s	(1986,	1995)	claims.	
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Sperber	and	Wilson	(1995,	p.	28-29)	argue	the	recognition	of	the	
speaker’s	intention	(b)	is	sufficient	for	the	speaker	to	be	successful	in	
communicating	a	set	of	information	{I},	regardless	of	whether	intentions	
(a)	and	(c)	have	been	fulfilled.	Therefore,	only	intention	(b)	is	truly	
communicative.	The	intention	(a)	cannot	be	an	intention	to	communicate,	
precisely	because	the	communication	can	be	successful	without	the	
intention	(a)	being	fulfilled.	Thus,	one	can	better	understand	it	as	an	
intention	to	inform	the	audience	of	something—the	set	of	information	{I}	
itself.	The	intention	(c)	is	even	less	necessary	since	it	can	only	be	fulfilled	if	
intention	(a)	is	fulfilled.	Unfortunately,	although	they	recognize	Grice’s	
merit	in	demonstrating	that	“the	recognition	of	an	informative	intention	
can	lead	to	its	fulfilment,”	and	this	is	often	the	reason	why	the	speaker	is	
willing	to	communicate—practical	intentions	in	my	terms—,	the	authors	
drop	intention	(c)	without	further	discussion	because	they	do	not	find	a	
justification	for	“turn	this	possibility	into	a	definitional	necessity”.	
Therefore,	one	describes	and	explains	communicational	processes	
only	by	communicative	(b)	and	informative	intention	(a)	in	relevance	
theory.	Sperber	and	Wilson	(1995,	p.	29-30)	argue	an	overt	ostensive	
stimulus	has	an	informative	intention	“to	inform	the	audience	of	
something”	and	a	communicative	intention	“to	inform	the	audience	of	one’s	
informative	intention”30.	“The	communicative	intention	is	itself	a	second-
order	informative	intention:	the	communicative	intention	is	fulfilled	once	
the	first-order	informative	intention	is	recognized”.	So,	although	the	
recognition	of	the	informative	intention	itself	leads	to	its	fulfilment	in	
general,	it	does	not	guarantee,	because	there	are	cases	where	only	the	
communicative	intention	is	fulfilled.	
As	I	have	illustrated	in	the	third	section,	it	seems	reasonable,	to	some	
extent	and	with	some	risk,	that	Peter’s	“Could	you	give	me	the	key?”	
utterance	enabled	him	to	make	mutually	manifest	or	more	manifest—
communicative	intention—his	intention	to	make	manifest	or	more	
manifest—informative	intention—that	he	wished	to	know	if	Anne	could	
give	him	the	front-door	key—explicature—;	and	that	he	intended	with	that	
explicature	that	Anne	provided	the	key	for	him	to	open	the	door—
implicature.	
Let	us	assume	Anne	does	indeed	achieve	these	two	intentions:	she	
realizes	this	set	of	information	{I}	has	become	mutually	manifested	or	more	
manifest	by	the	public	emergence	of	Peter’s	utterance,	and	she	yields	both	
the	correct	explicature	and	the	correct	implicature.	As	relevance	theory	
predicts,	nothing	else	is	necessary.	It	is	sufficient	for	Anne	to	know	Peter	
wants	her	to	provide	the	key	for	him	to	open	the	door.	However,	something	
seems	to	be	missing	here.	Just	wanting	Anne	to	know	Peter	wants	her	to	
give	the	key	is	not	what	is	at	stake	in	this	dialogue.	Peter	wants	Anne	to	give	
the	key—practical	intention—and	providing	this	information	only	makes	
sense	in	a	context	of	conciliating	that	practical	goal.	
 
30	Wilson	(2004,	lesson	1,	p.	6)	distinguishes	three	types	of	information	transmission:	accidental,	which	are	not	intentionally	
transmitted,	and	do	not	form	part	of	the	speaker’s	meaning;	covert,	which	involves	a	speaker’s	intention,	but	one	which	is	not	
intended	to	be	recognized	or	shared	with	an	audience,	and	also	does	not	form	part	of	the	speaker’s	meaning;	and	overt,	when	
the	speaker	not	only	intends	to	convey	a	certain	message,	but	intends	her	hearer	to	recognize	this	intention.	Only	in	the	overt	
information	transmission	there	are	two	layers	of	intention	for	the	hearer	to	pick	up:	a	basic	speaker’s	intention	to	inform	the	
audience	of	something,	and	a	higher-order	intention	the	hearer	should	recognize	that	basic	intention.	
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In	the	third	section,	we	saw	how	the	chains	of	inferences	of	Peter’s	
request	fail	in	different	ways,	and	we	assume	that	derives	from	the	lowest-
level	action	in	the	chain	of	goals	and	sub-goals	at	a	stake.	The	utterance	
here	works	as	an	enabling	antefactual	abductive	hypothesis	P⟵Q,	that	is,	it	
is	necessary,	but	not	sufficient	for	the	heteroconciliation	of	higher-level	
intentions.	These	failures	are	due	from	problems	in	the	accomplishment	of	
the	action	L	of	communicating	the	request	for	the	front-door	key	(2a),	
passing	by	problems	in	the	processing	of	the	sub-goal	M	of	informing	the	
request	(2b)	and,	mainly,	problems	in	the	processing	of	the	practical	goal	
N-Q	of	asking	for	the	key	to	open	the	door	himself	(2c-f).	
If	that	is	correct,	one	should	describe	and	explain	communicative	
intentions	in	service	of	informational	intentions	under	the	scope	of	plans	of	
intentional	action	towards	collaborative	heteroconciliation	of	practical	
goals.	So,	it	is	essential	to	reintegrate	Strawson’s	intention	(c),	noticing	the	
connection	between	the	audience’s	response	r,	and	the	recognition	of	the	
informational	intention	(a)	through	the	communicational	stimulus	(b).	
Hence,	one	can	integrate	communicative	and	informative	intentions	in	a	
descriptive-explanatory	approach	aiming	at	the	study	of	human	intentional	
action	and	allowing	to	include	the	speaker	as	a	proactive	agent	capable	of	
producing	ostensible	communicational	stimuli	to	fulfil	his/her	practical	
purposes.	
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